DAYS OF TRANSITION - -  1942

 By: Gen. Bruce K. Holloway

          The summer of 1942 stands out in my treasure house of old-china- hand memories as the low point of a long struggle to get the “mostest from the leastest”.  I was privileged to be a key participant in the transition from the A.V.G. to the China Air Task Force, and remember vividly the frustrations and disappointments which followed the initial euphoric predictions of federalizing the assets of the American Volunteers into the 23^rd Fighter Group.

          July 4^th was a great day.  General Chennault was appointed CATF Commander, Bob Scott 23^rd Fighter Group Commander, and a medium bomb Squadron of B-25s, the 11^th, added to bolster up our original operating forces.We thought this was only the beginning, and that other wherewithal would be added as fast as our logistics structure could be expanded to accommodate it, and that China soon would be given the priorities to make it a prime theatre of operations.

          We should have known better, or at least I should have.  Things did not improve for quite awhile for some very good reasons (and one or two bad reasons), all of which could have been readily foreseen.

          The first concerned priorities, the second access, and the third line of communications distances.   All were interrelated.  Although the A.V. G. was spectacularly successful in it’s operations against the Japanese Air Force in Burma and Western China, this could not possibly have been cause to accord U. S. involvement there a major priority in those early days.  The combined spectre of overwhelming German successes in Europe and North Africa, and the initial Japanese conquests much closer to home were reason enough, but when the problem of pipe-line distance with total dependency on airlift for the final 500 miles were added, little supporting argument remained.  We, the United States of America, had our hands full, and  we supported the Chinese Government to the degree felt necessary for containing a sizeable portion of the Japanese military effort.  I might add, in looking back, that it was one of the most cost-effective investments in the history of warfare. 

          I arrived in China at the end of May, and was attached to the A. V. G. Squadron at Peishiyi and Kweilin for a month or so prior to July 4^th.  It was time well spent, and I learned much about air warfare in a remote part of the world that you would never learn from War College or Tactical School texts.

Moreover, I made some lasting friends such as Tex Hill, Ed Rector and Charlie Bond.  Tex and Ed stayed on as Commanders of the 75^th and 76^th Squadrons respectively, and I made Operations Officer of the 23^rd Group.

          Many of the pilots, armorers, mechanics, and other types of the AVG went home when the China Air Task Force was formed.  It was their Option, and I believe slightly more than half did leave even though they were offered attractive stay-on inducements as either commissioned or non- commissioned officers.  Luckily, we did have three veterans who stayed as squadron commanders (Hill, Rector, and Schiel), and a few outstanding maintenance Chiefs ( e. g. Gerhard Neumann and Chris Dolovgian ), but the echelons of experience were severely depleted, and it took awhile to begin a slow climb to anything resembling efficient performance. 

          We were short of everything:  Airplanes in good shape;  airplanes in any shape;  facilities to put them in shape; local support; depot support;  trained people; discipline; training organization;  transportation; communications;  fuel;  ammunition; weather and navigation aids; a parent 10^th Air Force Commander who disliked our boss (and vice versa) and a Theatre Commander who had no use for air power.  The only thing we had plenty of was resolve to do the best we could, and with few exceptions, good morale.  Perhaps the best way to emphasize this rather wholesale dilemma is to draw from a few entries in my diary of that interesting summer.

Kunming, August 16^th

          Casey Vincent came in today from Dinjan.  He had started from New Delhi with a P-40 for us, got as far as Dinjan where three other P-40s were standing by for us, waited there four days for weather, and finally got tired waiting and proceeded by transport up here.  He said the P-40 he was flying had been sitting at New Delhi for a month because nobody would bother to replace a leaking internal fuel tank.

Kunming, August 17th  

The 74th squadron is just about devoid of airplanes. They have wrecked eighteen in the last two weeks. General Chennault made a talk this morning, highlighting “Mountain Terror”, which he believes has something to do with the many crack-ups. I think something else has more to do with it. Frank Schiel finally gave me a list of five pilots he wanted to get rid of after I had hounded him two days for it. I submitted the list with recommendations (including an addition from the 76th which did not meet with Colonel Scott’s approval) to General Chennault for either change of duty or additional training in India.

Kunming, August 18^th

          We had another false alert today, and another airplane was wrecked on landing.  These lads we are getting are the worst pursuit pilots I have yet seen..

          Twice now the same person on the warning net has sent in a false report – so today he was shot.

          Another shooting – last night at Changyi.  It was accidental, but a sergeant was killed.

Kunming, August 19^th

          Went to Dinjan to get the four P-40s.  Sent a radiogram before leaving ordering the other three pilots to stay there until I arrived to lead flight back.  They had only been there two weeks waiting for the weather to suit them, but of course on this particular day decided to go before I arrived.   The radio message arrived next day.

          The fourth plane was still there because they had not been able to determine whether the main or reserve tank was leaking, so they took them both out --- a process which had taken all day.  There was a replacement reserve tank on hand at Dinjan, but no main.  I offered a ten to one bet on which tank was bad but got no takers.

 

Dinjan August 20^th

          My bet would have been good.   Furthermore, the leaky tank had just been installed at Allahabad before the flight to Dinjan.  I radioed both Kunming and Karachi “extra urgent” for another tank.  It took 48 hours to get a reply “none available”.

 

Dinjan August 21^st

          While waiting went on a bombing raid as co-pilot of one of two B-25s.  Bombed Myitkyina from 3000 feet and didn’t even hit the runway.  No radiogram all day.  Played  badminton and went to bed after supper.

 

Dinjan, August 22^nd

          After receiving radiogram stating no tank available, caught a C-47 back to Kunming with a load of 5200 pounds of copper pigs.  They were just sitting there lined up in rows under the bucket seats, not secured in any way, and when we began to accelerate down the runway a few in the back started to slide.  I rarely remember being more scared, but fortunately they did not move much more and we made it without further incident.

Upon arriving Kunming, organized a search party for a tank.  One was found, and S. O. S. sent it down to the field.

 

KUNMING  August 23^rd

      By now determined personnally to get the P-40 from Dinjan, went back that afternoon with the S. O. S. tank.  It leaked like a sieve.  I had nobody to blame but myself for not testing before leaving Kunming(took sombody else’s assurance).  This was “the final blow”  Sat down in a state of rage.

 

DINJAN  AUGUST 25^TH

          Solid rain for two days.  The effort spent at getting one airplane to the front lines as described in the last few installments of this diary shows two things: 

          a. The terrific fight it takes to accomplish anything in this country.

          b. How badly we want combat airplanes.

          Lieutenant O’Neil of the 16^th squadron had arrived here in Dinjan in the meantime with a P-40E-1.  Colonel Barr (51^st Fighter Group) was planning to use it on a raid this morning and it isn’t even asssigned to his outfit.  That was another blow.  I finally jumped in it and took off for Kunming before he showed up, and instructed Lt. O’Neil to hold tight and I would get over another tank for the problem bird that might, by some unadulterated fate, not leak. 

          Arrived Kunming in the pouring rain and found that Lieutenant Mikeworth of the 74^th squadron had spun into the lake in a P-40 for reason unknown and no trace was found of plane or pilot.  So, besides the tragic loss of a pilot the replacement aircraft I brought over  merely allows us to hold our own for the time being.

 

KUNMING, August 26^th

          Took off at 0630 in P-40 # 81 and went to Yunnanyi, gassed up, and thence down over Lashio at 26,000 feet to see what they had to offer.  Weather was good but there was a low-lying overcast over Lashio itself.  I stayed for 45 minutess but the clouds did not break.  Got back into Yunnanyi with ten gallons of gas.  And while enroute tried  to raise the radio to transmit a no-go signal to Kunming where B-25s and escort were poised for a mission.  Yunnanyi radio could not hear me, so upon landing I wrote out the message, gave it to a truck driver to deliver pronto to the radio shack for dispatch, but it did not get out.  The truck broke down on the way the to the shack. 

          Furthermore, I was delayed in servicing because the local gas truck driver ran his engine up to a steady roar and engaged the pump without using the clutch.  After this about a half hour was spent finding some funnels and a hand pump. 

          I departed as soon as I could and bent the throttle all the way back to Kunming.  Was equally unsuccessful in getting a message through enroute, and upon landing learned the bombers had gotten tired of waiting for a signal and had departed for Lashio twenty minutes earlier. 

          Another action conpletely balled up on account of general inefficiency of all concerned. 

          And so it went.  That afternoon I found another P-40 main tank, personally tested it, and put it on a transport bound for Dinjan and the aircraft so long stranded there.  We finally did get that P-40 to Kunming, but before it arrived we lost the one I had brought over before Colonel Barr could commandeer it.  Just at dusk we had a head on collision on the runway at Kunming.  For some unaccountable reason two P-40s landed in opposite directions and for some other unaccountable reason did not see each other in time for evasive action.  Flames shot into the air in a sickening display and both pilots were killed.  One result of this accident was announcement that anyone not landing with the tee would be permanently removed from flying status and anyone not landing in the first third of the runway would be fined twenty-five dollars.

          One might well ask why I would spend so much time as Group Operations Officer and second in Command in getting so deeply involved into the nitty-gritty of things;  of making several trips across the hump in the leaky tank syndrome to get one badly needed P-40;  of making reconnaissance flights to determine whether or not a planned bomber mission should go.  There are three answers.

          The first answer is that I was not doing these things exclusively. 

          The second is that the transition situation was so bad with the exportation of experience and importation of inexperience that know-how assets which did exist had to be spread mighty thin.  I considered myself a part of this.

          The third and most important reason was the need to learn by observation and participation at the extreme grass roots level what your problems really are.  If you hoped to build a structure to cope with them, where responsibility can be safely delegated, and where you thoroughly get to know your people and their qualifications, it is the only way to go.  You cannot do this in a newly formed outfit by just managing the paper work, checking reports, making inspections, and going on missions in either a wing or lead pisition. 

          Since most everyone who reads this will have been at some time during the 1942-46 period a member of the 14^th Air Force (or CATF or CACW), he or she will know that things got better. They did, of course.  We were blessed with good leadership, and we established our own training facilities in-country and out.  Initial training in the states also improved, and  we perhaps eventually had our appropriate share of outstanding talent in both the operational and support fields.  Moreover, the force structure expanded several fold.

          The quantity and quality of materiel assets and transportation also improved, but certainly not in monumental proportions.   Never did the 14^th Air Force have anywhere near the assets it needed to do the job.  In the end it depended exclusively on air supply except for those services which the Chinese people could provide.  I am proud to have been a member of this unique club which accomplished so much with so little, and fortunate to have been in a position to help get it going in that critical summer of 1942.